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LAND WITHOUT PLEA BARGAINING:
HOW THE GERMANS DO IT
John H. Langbein*t
As the death grip of adversary procedure has tightened around
the common law criminal trial, trial has ceased to be workable as a
routine dispositive proceeding. Our criminal justice system has be-
come ever more dependent on processing cases of serious crime
through the nontrial procedure of plea bargaining. Unable to adju-
dicate, we now engage in condemnation without adjudication. Be-
cause our constitutions guarantee adjudication, we threaten the
criminal defendant with a markedly greater sanction if he insists on
adjudication and is convicted. This sentencing differential, directed
towards inducing the defendant to waive his right to trial, makes
plea bargaining work. It also makes plea bargaining intrinsically co-
ercive. I have elsewhere had occasion to point to the host of irreme-
diable deficiencies - moral, juridical, practical - that inhere in the
plea bargaining system.'
Plea bargaining is such a recent2 and transparent evasion of our
cherished common law tradition of criminal trial that its well-mean-
ing practitioners and proponents feel a deep need for reassurance
that what they are doing is not so bad as it looks. Rather lately,
apologists for American plea bargaining have been sounding a
theme purportedly derived from comparative law. As a corollary to
the proposition that plea bargaining is not really so bad, the claim is
advanced that everybody else does it too. Plea bargaining is said to
be universal, at least in the legal systems of advanced industrial
countries.3
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago. A.B. 1964, Columbia University; LL.B. 1968,
Harvard University; LL.B. 1969, Ph.D. 1971, Cambridge University. -Ed.
t References and suggestions from Albert Alschuler, Gerhard Casper, Joachim Herr-
mann, Norval Morris, Geoffrey Stone, Thomas Weigend, and Peter Westen are gratefully ac-
knowledged.
1. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (1978), expanded in a
revision in THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Winter 1980, at 43.
2. See Alschuler, Plea Bargaining andltsHistory, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1979), abridged as
Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 13 LAW & Socy. REv. 211 (1979); Langbein, Un-
derstanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SocY. REV. 261 (1979).
3. E.g., McDonald, From Plea Negotiation to Coercive Justice: Notes on the RespecIfcation
ofa Concept, 13 LAW & Socy. REv. 385, 386 (1979); Goldstein & Marcus, The Myth ofJudidlal
Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial" Systems.- France Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240,
264-79 (1977).
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The present Article demonstrates the error of this universalist
theory of plea bargaining by showing how and why one major legal
system, the West German, has so successfully avoided any form or
analogue of plea bargaining in its procedures for cases of serious
crime. The German criminal justice system functions without plea
bargaining not by good fortune, but as a result of deliberate policies
and careful institutional design whose essential elements are out-
lined in Part I. Part II addresses the American claims that a clandes-
tine plea bargaining system lurks behind veils of German pretense.
By way of preface we should say a word about the raison d'etre
of American plea bargaining, which is after all nothing more than
simple expediency. We indulge in this practice of condemnation
without adjudication because we think we have to, not because we
want to. We know that plea bargaining lacks foundation in our con-
stitutions and in our legal traditions.4 Even among the proponents
of plea bargaining, few indeed would contend that it is an intrinsi-
cally desirable mode of rendering criminal justice. The largest claim
for plea bargaining is that it may approximate (although it cannot
equal) the outcomes of true adjudication, but at lower cost. The
Supreme Court has been mercifully frank in explaining why it feels
obliged to treat plea bargaining as "an essential component of the
administration of justice. . . .If every criminal charge were sub-
jected to a full-scale trial, the States and the federal government
would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and
court facilities. ' 5
The reasons for our latter-day dependence on plea bargaining are
also tolerably well understood, although much of the detail of the
historical development remains to be traced out. Over the two cen-
turies since the Americans constitutionalized jury trial, we have
transformed it, submerging it in such time-consuming complexity
that we can now employ it only exceptionally. Eighteenth-century
criminal jury trial was a summary proceeding, still largely judge-di-
rected and lawyer-free; the law of evidence lay all but entirely in the
future; the extended voir dire was unknown; appeal was as a practi-
cal matter unavailable.6 Felony trials took place with such remarka-
ble dispatch that judges actually discouraged defendants from
4. See Alschuler, supra note 2; Langbein, supra note 2. See also Note, The Unconstitution-
ality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1387 (1970).
5. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
6. This point is developed in Langbein, supra note 1, at 9-11; the historical evidence is
presented in Langbein, The Criminal Trialbefore the Lawyers, 45 U. CHi. L. Rv. 263 (1978).
See also the summary in Langbein, supra note 2, at 262-65.
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tendering guilty pleas.7 Plea bargaining is now "an essential compo-
nent of the administration of justice" because what the Supreme
Court calls "full-scale trial"8 (meaning of course jury trial) has be-
come so complicated. The vast elaboration of adversary procedure
and the law of evidence has made our constitutionally guaranteed
trial procedure so costly that it can be used in only a tiny fraction of
cases of serious crime.
I. THE GERMAN WAY OF TRIAL9
The Germans do without plea bargaining because they do not
need it. German criminal procedure has resisted adversary domina-
tion and exclusionary rules of evidence. Trial procedure has been
kept uncomplicated and rapid. Accordingly, all the reasons of prin-
ciple that would (and in former times did) incline us to try our cases
of serious crime can still be felt and obeyed in Germany.
A. Routine Nonadversary Trial
German trial courts for cases of serious crime come in two vari-
eties, each composed of a panel of professional judges and laymen
who together deliberate and decide all issues of culpability and sen-
tence. The more serious cases are tried before a court of three pro-
fessional judges and two laymen;' 0 the court that deals with lesser
imprisonable offenses and with many nonimprisonable offenses" sits
with one professional and two laymen.' 2 In both courts a two-thirds
majority is necessary to convict and to sentence. Accordingly, the
laymen can veto the professionals, and in the lesser court override
them.' 3 The laymen are selected and assigned for service through a
rigorously randomized scheme paralleling that used to assign
caseloads to professional judges and are subject to pretrial challenge
only on the narrow grounds that may disqualify the professional
judges. 14 At the conclusion of a trial before one of these so-called
7. Langbein, supra note 6, at 277-79.
8. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
9. This account follows J. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY
61-86 (1977), where the relevant sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG) [hereinafter abbreviated as STPO, following German convention]
are translated or summarized and discussed.
10. The grosse Strafkammer.
11. The Schoffengedcht.
12. For details on the division of business among the courts, see Casper & Zeisel, Lay
Judges in the German Criminal Courts, I J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 141-43 (1972).
13. See J. LANGBFIN, supra note 9, at 61-63, 79-80.
14. Id at 141-42 & n.1.
[Vol. 78:204
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"mixed" courts (mixing professional judges and laymen), the court
deliberates and decides on verdict and sentence simultaneously. The
court's judgment discloses its findings of fact and its applications of
law in a reasoned opinion written by a professional judge. Both de-
fense and prosecution have a liberal right to seek appellate review on
issues of sentence as well as liability.' 5
Virtually all of the features of German court structure that strike
an Anglo-American observer as distinctive have the effect of acceler-
ating the conduct of trial by comparison with our own arrangements.
Because it is so difficult to identify and to remedy error behind the
one- or two-word verdict of an Anglo-American jury, we have con-
centrated over the last two centuries on devising prophylactic proce-
dures to prevent error - for instance, the voir dire of prospective
jurors, the vast exclusionary apparatus of the law of evidence, and
the bewildering technique of multiple contingent judicial instruc-
tions to the jury ("If you find such-and-such, then. . ."). By con-
trast, the German system has no analogue to voir dire or to the law
of jury control, despite having laymen sit on every trial for serious
crime and despite extending the laymen's authority to matters of sen-
tence as well as guilt determination. Professional judges speak to
points of law only when legal issues become relevant in delibera-
tions; important legal rulings show up in the written judgment and
are available for scrutiny on appeal. The Germans also believe that
the presence of professionals in deliberations and the requirement of
written findings of fact and law are sufficient safeguards against the
misuse of potentially prejudicial varieties of evidence; accordingly,
the general principle is that virtually all relevant evidence is admissi-
ble, and time is not spent arguing about exclusion and otherwise
manipulating evidence in the familiar Anglo-American ways.16
The nonadversarial character of the proof-taking further acceler-
ates the oral public trial. To use our parlance, the presiding judge
both "examines" and "cross-examines," after which he invites his
fellow judges (professional and lay), the prosecutor, the defense
counsel, and the accused to supplement his questioning. In examin-
ing, the presiding judge works from the official file of the case, the
dossier, which contains the pretrial statements and public records
gathered by police and prosecutors. These officials work under a
statutory duty to investigate exculpatory as well as inculpatory evi-
dence. This duty is reinforced in the pretrial phase by giving to the
15. Id at 80-85.
16. Id at 66-70.
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defense liberal rights to inspect the dossier, together with the right to
motion the prosecution to investigate (at public expense) any defen-
sive claims and evidence that might have been overlooked.' 7
This thorough, open, and impartial pretrial preparation effec-
tively eliminates surprise and forensic strategy from the trial. It also
enables the presiding judge who determines the sequence of wit-
nesses to control for relevance and to minimize needless duplication
of trial testimony. Thus, the court that must decide the case con-
ducts its own trial inquiry in a businesslike and undramatic fashion,
overseen by prosecution and defense.' 8 Nonadversarial procedure
recognizes no party burdens of proof. German law adheres to a
standard of proof not materially different from our beyond-reason-
able-doubt;' 9 but without the system of adversary presentation of ev-
idence, there is no occasion to think of the "prosecution case" (or,
indeed, of the defendant's burden of proving an "affirmative de-
fense"). The only burden is the court's. In order to convict, the
court must satisfy itself of the truth of the charges after taking the
relevant evidence, including that requested by prosecution and de-
fense.
A German trial begins with the examination of the accused. The
presiding judge must instruct him about his right to remain silent,20
but for a variety of reasons the typical German accused feels little
incentive to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination. In the
Anglo-American system of adversary presentation of evidence and
party burdens of poof, the accused is effectively silenced for the du-
ration of the prosecution case. Our rule admitting past conviction
evidence only if the accused speaks in his own defense further en-
courages him to rely wholly upon the intermediation of counsel. 21
German procedure, being free of adversary domination of the proofs
and of exclusionary rules of evidence, has a privilege against self-
incrimination that is not overused. The German trial court thus typ-
ically hears from the accused, who is almost always the most efficient
testimonial resource. This sequence is also an important time-saver:
17. See Langbein & Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: "Myth" and Realiy, 87
YALE L.. 1549, 1563 (1978), and authorities cited therein at 1563 nn.52-53.
18. The court's discretion to refuse to hear witnesses requested by prosecution and defense
is narrowly circumscribed. STPO § 244. The so-called rule of orality obliges the court to call
major witnesses (subject to a few exceptions), assuring confrontation with the accused at trial.
19. See J. LANGBEIN, supra note 9, at 78-79.
20. See id at 72.
21. See Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Proce-
dure: 4 Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 527 (1973); J. LANOBEIN, supra note 9, at
73.
[Vol. 78:204
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by speaking first with the accused, the court establishes at the outset
of the trial precisely which (if any) matters charged by the prosecu-
tion are genuinely contested, thus limiting the range and depth of the
subsequent proof-taking.
The accused frequently confesses some or all of the charges
against him, and in Part II of this Article I shall deal with sugges-
tions that such confessions evince a form of plea bargaining. The
important point for present purposes is that German procedure
knows no guilty plea for cases of felony or grave misdemeanor. (For
lesser offenses there is an analogue to our guilty plea, the penal order
procedure discussed below.) By confessing to a major offense, an
accused does not waive trial. Confession affects but does not abort
the criminal trial. Confession shortens the trial by enriching the
proofs but does not relieve the court of its duty of independent adju-
dication - its duty to satisfy itself of the accused's guilt beyond rea-
sonable doubt.
In an empirical study of the German mixed-court system con-
ducted in 1969-1970, Gerhard Casper and Hans Zeisel quantified
trial duration data from a careful sample of about 600 cases. They
found that "roughly one-half of all criminal trials (47 per cent) last
no longer than one-third of a day, or approximately two hours. The
average. . . duration of a [lesser court] trial is one-third of a day or
about two hours, of a [major court] trial one day. .. .22 My mis-
sion in what I have thus far said about German criminal procedure
has been to make these astonishing trial duration figures comprehen-
sible to an American readership. For the rapidity of trial procedure
is the essential factor that explains the absence of plea bargaining in
Germany. German trial procedure, unlike American, has retained
an efficiency that makes trial practical for every case of imprisonable
crime.
The rapidity of German trial procedure is not, of course, the only
important factor; another is that crime rates in the United States are
higher than in Germany - four times higher is a good rule of
thumb.23 If the Germans had our levels of serious crime, they would
22. Casper & Zeisel, supra note 12, at 149-50 (1972). The term rendered above as "lesser
court" is in the original Schoffengericht; as "major court," grosse Strafkammer. See text at
notes 10-12 supra.
23. Population-adjusted figures for the following major offenses are given in J. LANGBEIN,
supra note 9, at 110-11; the figures show the ratio of these offenses in America to those in
Germany: murder 4.45; rape 2.38; robbery 6.63; aggravated assault 2.79; auto theft 4.64. For
an indication of the difficulty in achieving precision in such figures see Arzt, Responses to the
Growth of Crime in the United States and West Germany: A Comparison of the Changes in
Criminal Law and SocietalAttitudes, 12 CORNELL INTL. L.J. 43, 45 (1979).
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find it much more costly than they now do to operate a system in
which all cases of very serious crime go to full trial. They would
almost certainly need to divert more of their caseload into the non-
trial channels discussed below than they now do.2 4 But the Germans
would not need a sentence differential in order to redraw their
trial/nontrial line at some higher point on the scale of gravity of
offenses; and within the sphere of cases deemed appropriate for trial
in such altered circumstances, all the factors of procedural dispatch
previously discussed would continue to spare the Germans the need
to subvert their trial procedures by plea bargaining.
Crime rates alone neither explain nor justify the American resort
to plea bargaining. Plea bargaining has been documented in Eng-
land25 where crime rates are closer to German than to American
levels; 26 the constant factor in both England and the United States is,
of course, adversary criminal procedure.
B. The Rule of Compulsory Prosecution
Not only can the Germans do without plea bargaining, they want
to do without it. That is the lesson of the German scheme for elimi-
hating prosecutorial discretion in cases of serious crime.
Section 152(11) of the Code of Criminal Procedure prescribes the
celebrated rule of compulsory prosecution (Legaliid'tsprinzp) that
has been in force for a century.27 In the field of serious crime the
German prosecutor must prosecute "all prosecutable offenses, to the
extent that there is a sufficient factual basis."'28 Section 153(1) of the
Code permits the counterprinciple of discretionary nonprosecution
(Opportunita'Smrinzip) but only for misdemeanors (Vergehen) and
then only if the culprit's guilt can "be regarded as minor" and "there
24. For the suggestion that this process is underway see Arzt, supra note 23.
25. Baldwin & McConville, Plea Bargaining and Plea Negotiation in England, 13 LAW &
Socy. REV. 287 (1979); J. BALDWIN & M. MCCONVILLE, NEGOTIATED JUSTICE: PRESSURES
TO PLEAD GUILTY (1977).
26. English crime rates are actually lower than German for the three gravest offenses for
which the data is unmistakably comparable. With the American-to-German ratios in note 23
supra, compare the population-adjusted ratios for American-to-English crime rates for the
same year (1975); murder 9.25; rape 12.47; robbery 9.48. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES: 1975, at 49 (1976); HOME OFFICE, CRIMINAL STA-
TISTICS, ENGLAND AND WALES: 1976, at 358-59 (1977). (rhe population adjustment for En-
gland is based on the population figure in CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, MONTHLY DIGEST
OF STATISTICS 16 (August 1979).)
27. An outstanding account of the historical development and modem scope of the rule of
compulsory prosecution appears in T. WEIGEND, ANKLAGEPFLICHT UND ERMESSEN: DIE
STELLUNG DES STAATSANWALTS ZWISCHEN LEGALITATS- UND OPPORTUNITATSPRINZIP NACH
DEUTSCHEM UND AMERIKANISCHEM RECHT (1978). For an English-language account, see
Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 439 (1974).
28. STPO § 15201).
[Vol. 78:204
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is no public interest in prosecuting. '29 Consequently, the German
law requires that all felonies (Verbrechen) and all misdemeanors that
cannot be excused under the two statutory criteria of pettiness must
be prosecuted whenever the evidence permits.3 0
The strongest incentives are created to enforce this rule of com-
pulsory prosecution. If the prosecutor determines not to prosecute
an offense that is subject to the rule - whether for want of sufficient
factual basis or on grounds of legal insufficiency - the victim or kin
may obtain departmental review of the determination; if the prose-
cutor's superiors uphold his decision, the citizen may appeal to the
courts in a proceeding to compel prosecution. The prosecutorial
corps is a career service with strictly meritocratic promotion stan-
dards. Prosecutors do not want their personnel records blotted with
citizen complaints, especially successful complaints. Prudence coun-
sels them to resolve doubts in favor of prosecution and trial.3 1
A crucial corollary of this system is that the form of plea bargain-
ing called charge or count bargaining in American practice can have
no counterpart in German procedure. The prosecutor, who is duty-
bound to prosecute in every case, lacks authority, for example, to
offer to reduce the charge in return for a concession of guilt. The
rule of compulsory prosecution requires him to take the case to trial
in the strongest and most inclusive form that the evidence will sup-
port; if he does not, the court itself is empowered to correct his er-
ror.32 So strict is the rule that it prevents the Germans from
employing that endemic device of Anglo-American prosecutorial
practice, the grant of immunity for state's evidence.33
Obviously, the German rule of compulsory prosecution of seri-
ous crime is no happenstance. The statutory standards, limitations,
and remedies have been meticulously designed to fit the institutional
structure and to serve the larger policies of the German criminal jus-
tice system. The rule is meant to achieve ends that are immensely
important in the German tradition: treating like cases alike, obeying
faithfully the legislative determination to characterize something as a
29. STPO § 153(1).
30. There are a few statutory exceptions, of no quantitative importance, collected in
Langbein, supra note 27, at 458 n.48.
31. For a discussion of these incentives to prosecute in tenable cases see id at 448-50, 463-
67.
32. STPO § 206, discussed in J. LANGBEIN, supra note 9, at 9. See also STPO §§ 155(I),
264-66, discussed in J. LANGBEIN, supra note 9, at 66-67.
33. Proposals to adopt the Anglo-American practice are periodically made and defeated in
Germany. See the discussion and authorities cited in T. WEiGEND, supra note 27, at 35 &
n. 116; Arzt, supra note 23, at 49 n.20.
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serious crime, preventing political interference or other corruption
from inhibiting prosecution, and more.34 The wisdom of these poli-
cies is not lost on Americans, but we lack the procedural institutions
- above all a workable trial procedure - that would allow us to
have a comparable rule of compulsory prosecution. As long as we
depend upon plea bargaining to resolve our caseloads, we must give
our prosecutors their bargaining chips.
Toward the bottom of the range of crimes so serious that they are
subject to the rule of compulsory prosecution are those for which the
sanction of imprisonment either is not allowed at all or would be
inappropriate in the particular case. Some of these offenses are rela-
tively common, including various smaller larcenies and serious mo-
tor vehicle offenses. In these cases prosecution may occur under a
nontrial procedure called the penal order (Srabefehl); here, there-
fore, compulsory prosecution does not mean compulsory trial. Im-
mediately below in Part II, I shall describe the working of this short-
form penal order procedure, which has been a main subject of
American efforts to find plea bargaining analogues in German prac-
tice. I shall also take up in Part II certain facets of the German han-
dling of petty crime - those misdemeanors that fall beneath the
statutory reach of the rule of compulsory prosecution. For although
the proposition that I am addressing is that German criminal proce-
dure functions without plea bargaining in cases of serious crime,
analogues drawn from German procedures for handling petty crime
have a way of turning up in American critiques of the German sys-
tem without due regard to the bright line that is drawn in Germany
between the procedural standards appropriate to serious and to petty
crime.
II. CONFUSIONS WITH PLEA BARGAINING
German law forbids plea bargaining, and German legal profes-
sionals of all sorts -judges, prosecutors, academics, and (most im-
portantly) defense counsel - consistently maintain that the law is
obeyed. The disdain that American plea bargaining evokes in Ger-
many is not confined to legal circles. Even in the ordinary press,
American plea bargaining is regarded with astonishment bordering
on incredulity.35
34. Langbein, supra note 27, at 448-50.
35. See id at 457 n.44:
Plea bargaining is all but incomprehensible to the Germans, whose ordinary disposi-
tive procedure is workable without such evasions. In the German press the judicial proce-
dure surrounding the resignation of Vice President Agnew was viewed with the sort of
wonder normally inspired by reports of the customs of primitive tribes. "The resignation
[Vol. 78:204
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So much is, I believe, conceded even by the American observers
who purport to discern plea bargaining analogues in German prac-
tice. We can distinguish two main themes in this American writing.
The more charitable critique is what we might call the delusion the-
sis: The Germans know not what they do; if they were to analyze
certain of their procedures correctly, they would find that they have
not eliminated plea bargaining but only concealed it from them-
selves. The harsher form of American critique is the deception the-
sis: German prosecutors and courts knowingly engage in plea
bargaining, thus lying and lawbreaking.
Two facets of German criminal procedure inspire most of this
critique, the nontrial penal order procedure and the use of confes-
sion evidence in trial procedure. These we now examine.
A. Penal Order Procedure
The rule of compulsory prosecution manifests itself in the re-
quirement of compulsory trial, we have said, whenever prosecution
may result in imprisonment. For cases of misdemeanor in which im-
prisonment is not in question, German law permits the penal order
procedure, an alternative procedure that is both nontrial and conces-
sionary. I have elsewhere called this procedure "the German guilty
plea.'" 36 Penal order procedure lacks, however, that terrible attribute
that defines our plea bargaining and makes it coercive and unjust:
the sentencing differential by which the accused is threatened with
an increased sanction for conviction after trial by comparison with
that which is offered for confession and waiver of trial.
Penal order procedure is meant to be used in uncomplicated
cases of overwhelming evidence - for instance, against the shop-
lifter caught-in-the-act or the drunk driver whose blood sample in-
criminates him. The Code of Criminal Procedure authorizes the
prosecutor to prepare the penal order, which takes the form of a
draft judgment of the lowest criminal court. After the prosecutor
presents the draft and the official file to the court, the judge routinely
approves and issues the order without a hearing or serious considera-
tion of its merits.37 The order speaks as a provisional judgment of
the court: "Unless you object by such-and-such date, you are hereby
occurred as part of a 'cow-trade,' as it can only in the United States be imagined." Badis-
che Zeitung, Oct. 12, 1973, at 3, col. 2.
36. Langbein, supra note 27, at 455.
37. "A judge in Hamburg told me that he could review 70 routine cases in fifteen minutes
(shoplifting, for instance, or riding a subway without a ticket), an average of one case every 13
seconds; more attention is obviously paid to unusual cases." Felstiner, Plea Contracts in West
Germany, 13 LAW & Socy. REV. 309, 312 (1979) (emphasis original).
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sentenced to such-and-such criminal sanction(s) on account of such-
and-such conduct which offends such-and-such criminal proscrip-
tion(s)." The document instructs the accused that if he makes a
timely objection (within one week) he is entitled to a full criminal
trial. If he does object, the penal order becomes nugatory and an
ordinary trial will take place as though the penal order had never
issued.
Two major aspects of penal order procedure distinguish it from
American plea bargaining: the limitation to nonimprisonable misde-
meanors and the absence of a sentencing differential. The former is
explicit in the statute, and we need hardly belabor the contrast with
American practice, where plea bargaining is routine for felonies and
serious misdemeanors.
However, the statute does not by its terms prevent the imposition
of a higher sentence on an accused who declines a penal order and is
thereafter convicted at trial. Such a prohibition would collide with
important principles of German criminal procedure - the prosecu-
tor's duty not to recommend a sentence at trial until he has heard all
the evidence adduced there, and the trial court's responsibility to in-
form itself similarly before imposing sentence. Thus, it remains
open to the prosecutor to decide that the case appears more serious
after trial than when he proposed the rejected penal order, and ac-
cordingly to recommend a higher sentence. He would, however,
have to substantiate that view in order to persuade the court; and the
cases in which prosecutors initially employ penal order procedure
are just those relatively uncomplicated ones in which it would be
hardest to make out such a claim, cases in which there will seldom be
any incriminating evidence adduced at trial beyond that already
known-to the prosecutor (and so recorded in the dossier) at the time
of the issuance of the rejected penal order.
For this "German guilty plea" to support a German plea bar-
gaining system, prosecutors would have to recommend and courts
would have to impose such increased penalties in rejected penal or-
der cases with sufficient frequency to achieve the necessary deterrent
effect. The American sentencing differential works by threat: "con-
cede guilt and accept X penalty, or go to trial and risk X-plus." In
the form of plea bargaining styled "explicit," the prosecutor delivers.
the threat in negotiations with the accused or his counsel. In so-
called "implicit" plea bargaining, the differential is nonnegotiated.
In either case the system depends upon a widespread understanding
of the existence of the differential. The deal or tariff must be com-
municated to the accused, at minimum by his defense counsel, and
[Vol, 78:204
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sometimes by the prosecutor or judge as well. Happily for the task
of sensible researchers, a plea bargaining system must leave unmis-
takable traces in the work of the legal professionals. Even where, as
for example, in contemporary England, official ideology has been
until lately loath to acknowledge the existence of plea bargaining,
researchers have been able to document regular patterns of sentenc-
ing differential from interviews with numerous accused and defense
counsel.38
So far as I am aware, no one has even disputed the proposition
that it would violate German law for prosecutors or judges to at-
tempt to institute such sentencing differentials. Further, so far as I
am aware, every American investigator who has explored the Ger-
man practice in interviews with German legal professionals - in-
cluding defense counsel - has found complete adherence to the
position that no such sentencing differential exists.39 The how-to-do-
it handbooks for German defense counsel cover penal order practice
without a hint of any sentencing differential that counsel might ad-
vise about or exploit,40 a marked contrast to American literature of
this genre. A real insight of the last decade's plea bargaining schol-
arship in the United States has been to show how extensively the
plea bargaining system depends upon the cooperation and activity of
defense counsel, and how clearly defense counsel finds it in his own
interest to disclose - indeed exaggerate - the importance of his
role.4' Americans who think they find a plea bargaining system in
German penal order practice have never reconciled their claim with
the statements of German defense counsel that there is no sentencing
differential for counsel to communicate, manipulate, or complain
about.
In 1978 a pair of American coauthors did point to what they
called "evidence" 42 of a sentencing differential in the penal order
system: a remark in Brans's treatise on sentencing law that penal
orders are "often increased" (oft erhibht) following conviction at
38. See sources cited in note 25 supra.
39. See, ag., the remarks of Felstiner, supra note 37, at 317, 319-20.
40. The leading German work is H. DAHS, HANDBUCH DES STRAFVERTEIDIGERS (4th ed.
1977). The advantages that the author identifies for the accused in accepting a penal order are
entirely of the "process cost" variety. He speaks of the emotional burden of defending crimi-
nal charges through all levels of trial and appeal, the time that elapses, the publicity, the injury
to reputation, and the "moral and economic ruin" thereby occasioned. Id at 558. There is no
mention of sentencing leniency as a quid pro quo for accepting a penal order. A similar treat-
ment appears in H. SCHORN, DER STRAFVERTEIDIGER 183 (1966).
41. Alschuler, The Defense A4orney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179 (1975).
42. Goldstein & Marcus, Comment on Continental Criminal Procedure, 87 YALE L.J. 1570,
1574 (1978).
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trial.43 Bruns, however, makes no attempt to document this asser-
tion. His only authority, on which he evidently expanded, is a com-
plaint uttered in a law review article a quarter century ago (at the
dawn of the routinization and expansion of the modem penal order
system) by an appellate judge who suspected trial courts of engaging
in this forbidden practice.44
Lamentably, the coauthors who relied upon Bruns's remark did
not discuss the information in the remainder of Bruns's paragraph.
Bruns there points out that the principal appellate case on the ques-
tion of increased sentences in rejected penal order cases (decided in
1966) requires that the grounds for increasing a sentence beyond that
recommended in the rejected penal order be clearly set forth in the
trial court's judgment.45 Bruns then endorses the views of a contem-
porary commentator on the 1966 case, who developed the court's
reasoning and statutory interpretation to show that the only permis-
sible ground for increasing or decreasing a sentence proposed in a
rejected penal order was the appearance at trial of evidence not indi-
cated in the pretrial dossier when the rejected penal order issued.4 6
Since the American coauthors admit that a punitive sentencing dif-
ferential would be illegal and a ground for reversal on appeal,
47
what is left of their claim is the notion that the first instance courts -
despite the modem requirement that they state reasons for increased
sentences - might be disobeying the law and imposing sentencing
differentials so stealthily that neither defense counsel nor the appel-
late courts (staffed exclusively with former first instance judges)
could detect it.
More recently, the American investigator Felstiner examined this
question afresh in interviews with a cross section of German "judges,
prosecutors, and academics," who persuaded him that "defendants
are. . . not penalized for rejecting a penal order and insisting upon
a trial."'48 Felstiner points out how the mechanics of penal order
practice reinforce this conclusion:
43. Id at 1575 n.18 (citing H. BRUNS, STRAFZUMESSUNGSRECHT 607 (2d ed. 1974)).
44. Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 42, at 1575 n.18 (citing H. BRUNS, supra note 43, at
607). Bruns was discussing a section of an article on "mistakes in sentencing," Seibert, Fehler
bet der Strafzumessung, 6 MONATSSCHRIFT FOR DEUTSCHES RECHT 457, 459 (1952).45. H. BRUNS, supra note 43, at 608 (citing the decision of the Oberlandesgericht
Zweibrtlcken of Aug. 24, 1966 (noted in 21 MONATSSCHRIFT FOR DEtrSCHES RECHT 236
(1967))). The case is also reported in a reporter not available to me, 32 Verkehrsrechtssam-
mlung 219, the source to which Bruns cites.
46. Ostler, § 4114bs. 3 STPO - "/ater Wortlaut" und wirkicher Sinn, 21 NEUB JURIS-
TISCHE WOCHENSCHRFT 486 (1968).
47. Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 42, at 1575 n.18.
48. Felstiner, supra note 37, at 314.
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First, the penal order is an open offer. The defendant can accept it at
any time before trial simply by withdrawing his objection or paying the
fine: even a failure to show up for the trial is treated as an acceptance.
Once the trial has begun, the defendant -with the prosecutor's ap-
proval- can accept the penal order until final judgment is delivered.
That approval is generally given. (A veteran prosecutor in Bremen
told me that it is always given.)...
German legal ideology, moreover, is opposed to penalizing people
for their own tactical mistakes. For instance a German defendant who
appeals from a trial court decision and secures a new trial cannot end
up with a sentence more severe than that originally imposed. German
legal principles, then, suggest to prosecutors that it would be unfair to
penalize a defendant for not accepting a penal order at an earlier stage.
This attitude is so strong that one prosecutor, after eight years in the
role, told me wrongly that even the judge could not sentence a defend-
ant more harshly than the sentence offered in a rejected penal order.
In practice, when a trial appears to be going less well than a de-
fendant had expected, he offers to accept the penal order and the pros-
ecutor lets him do so.49
The attempt to infer a clandestine plea bargaining system from
penal order procedure in violation of German law not only conflicts
with the results of German and American legal scholarship, but also
ignores the institutional contexts that explain both the existence of
plea bargaining in America and its absence in Germany. As I have
emphasized in Part I of this Article, German trial procedure is so
rapid that the German prosecutor does not work under the same
pressure that his American counterpart feels to divert cases of serious
crime into the nontrial channel. The savings in trial time in the kind
of case (misdemeanor, uncomplicated facts, overwhelming evidence)
that is appropriate for penal order procedure could not be large
enough to tempt the German officials to illegality, in view of the
enormous sanctions that would threaten them upon detection.50
Furthermore, the prosecutorial career structure does not place the
German prosecutor under the incentive to "win" that his American
counterpart feels. His performance is not judged by the electorate in
a contest with a political opponent who may chide him for an inade-
quate conviction rate. German prosecutors undergo periodic depart-
mental review on a variety of factors including dispatch in handling
caseloads (dismissals as well as prosecutions); intra-office relations;
legal analysis and drafting; and the avoidance of judicial rebuke and
citizen complaint. 5' Whereas evidence suggests that American pros-
49. Id at 314-15 (emphasis in original).
50. See K. PETERs, STRAFPROZESS 142 (2d ed. 1966).
51. See T. WEIGEND, supra note 27, at 98-102
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ecutors do some of their hardest bargaining in their weaker or more
doubtful cases, 52 the incentives of the German system point the Ger-
man prosecutor firmly toward dismissing weak cases and trying the
rest.
The penal order/plea bargaining fallacy is, therefore, rather a
classic example of the false cognate in comparative law. Mechanical
resemblances - nontrial and concessionary procedure - have been
emphasized. Fundamental dissimilarities - the limitation to misde-
meanor, the want of a sentencing differential, and the factors that
explain those differences - have been disregarded. Actually, there
is an analogy between the penal order system and American prac-
tice, but it gives no comfort to those who seek to find plea bargaining
in Germany. The real parallel is the short-form American citation
practice for traffic offenses: "Pay this fine or appear in court. ' 53 A
German accused who waives trial and accepts a penal order for
shoplifting or drunk driving does so for the same reasons that an
American waives his right to trial on a charge of running a stop sign
- not in exchange for a lesser sanction, but to save the time, nui-
sance, occasional notoriety, and occasional defense costs involved in
waging hopeless contest. Penal order procedure does permit the ac-
cused who waives trial to spare himself these "process costs," but to
equate such an inconsiderable inducement with the coercive force of
the sentence differential of the American plea bargaining system is
transparent casuistry.
B. Confession at Trial
Having explained why Germans accused of run-of-the-mill mis-
demeanors often confess without sentencing inducement in the non-
trial penal order procedure, I now turn to the aspect of German trial
procedure that has sometimes been misconstrued as evidencing plea
bargaining. The accused is known to confess in a substantial propor-
tion of the cases that go to trial. In the Casper and Zeisel sample
there was an unrecanted confession in 41% of the cases tried.54 That
such figures would excite suspicion amongst Anglo-American ob-
52. See Alschuler, The Prosecutor'r Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 50, 60
(1968).
53. I suggested this comparison in Langbein, supra note 27, at 457. Felstiner, supra note
37, at 323, calls this illustration inapt because "penal orders are used for offenses that are much
more serious and complicated than traffic violations, including a considerable amount of pred-
atory commercial practice." This criticism is misplaced. In advancing the comparison I was
not saying that the Germans used penal order procedure only in cases in which we would use
traffic citations. I was pointing out how the concessionary mechanics of German penal order
procedure resemble those of our traffic citation system, which point Felstiner does not dispute.
54. Casper & Zeisel, supra note 12, at 146-47.
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servers is natural, for in our procedural world the unrecanted confes-
sion and the trial are (practically speaking) mutually exclusive. It is
tempting to treat such figures as evincing the "functional equivalent"
of plea bargaining, a "regular pattern of expectations" that
"[d]efendants who do not challenge the prosecutor's case can expect
greater leniency than those who deny their guilt. ' 55
This assumed case for a sentencing differential does not with-
stand careful analysis of the reality of German practice. Our starting
point is to recall that German procedure requires that every offense
which might result in imprisonment must go to trial (unless, of
course, it is dismissed outright for want of factual basis). Because
they have no nontrial procedure for felony and grave misdemeanors,
the Germans bring to trial the cases of overwhelming evidence, in-
cluding even the caught-in-the-act type, that the American system
would most likely process through plea bargaining. Precisely be-
cause an accused will be put to trial56 whether or not he confesses, he
cannot inflict significant costs upon the prosecution or the court by
contesting such a case.
Confessions are tendered at trial not for reward, but because
there is no advantage to be wrung from the procedural system by
withholding them. The accused knows what prospective evidence is
in the dossier, he knows what evidence the prosecutor has asked the
court to take at trial, and he is always examined about the matters
charged against him (although, as indicated, he has the privilege to
remain silent).
People do not like to be caught lying, even people who have al-
ready been caught committing serious crimes. It is ordinary human
nature not to deny the obvious when the truth is certain to come out
55. McDonald, supra note 3, at 386.
56. Goldstein and Marcus see a "subtle analogue" to American plea bargaining in the case
of serious crime in which the accused confesses at trial. "The uncontested trial is brief; few
witnesses are called; and the judge sees his task in calling witnesses less as developing the facts
than as confirming the confession." Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 3, at 267-68.
The analogue is in truth too subtle to make any sense. It is indeed true that a credible
confession ordinarily has such probative force that it allows the court to call fewer witnesses
and to probe less deeply than when guilt is contested. However, Casper and Zeisel found that
the saving in trial time in cases with full confession compared to those without was only 50%
for the two principal trial courts, "differences [that] are much smaller than one would expect
on the basis of American experience." Casper & Zeisel, supra note 12, at 150, commenting on
their Table 20, id at 151 (data from Schoffengericht and grosse Strafkammer). Furthermore,
in most confession cases the evidence is so overwhelming that the savings in trial time on
account of the confession would not be substantial. Furthermore, even when the dossier
records a pretrial confession, the court must prepare for a contested trial and summon suffi-
cient witnesses to conduct one, since the accused may recant the confession at trial. There is
still a world of juridical difference between an American court taking a plea and a German
court adjudicating guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the evidence.
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anyway. In such circumstances the accused who confesses needs no
reward beyond his own dignity and self-esteem. Every schoolboy
who has been caught with his hand in the cookie jar understands this
point. Only the Anglo-American lawyer, mired in his uniquely defi-
cient criminal procedure system, can regard such unbargained-for
statements as unnatural.
The Continental criminal procedural tradition forthrightly en-
courages an accused to yield to this natural impulse to make a clean
breast of the inevitable. Free of our system of adversary presenta-
tion of evidence and the attendant notions of party burdens of proof,
German courts do not have to wait for a "prosecution case" to be
established from the mouths of others before turning to the accused
for his views on the charges against him. In the German code the
only important rule of sequence that limits the discretion of the trial
court in the conduct of its proof-taking is the requirement that the
court hear first from the accused.57 Important safeguards ensure that
this examination of the accused - this invitation to confess -is not
oppressive. The privilege against self-incrimination protects the ac-
cused in his right to remain silent; the court must instruct him about
this right; and his counsel will have studied the dossier and have
advised him about the strength and character of the evidence that is
likely to be adduced at the trial.58 Secure in the effectiveness of these
safeguards, German law welcomes those confessions that can be ob-
tained without American-style reward.
Furthermore, a prominent component of the 41% German trial
confession rate is a type of case in which, far from concealing some
American-style sentencing deal or tariff, the real dispute concerns
the sentence. Where the disagreement between prosecutor and ac-
cused is not about liability but about sanction, the accused and his
counsel will not waste time at trial contesting evidence that they
know will establish culpability. They will concede guilt in order to
concentrate on the mitigating factors that they hope will persuade
the court against the prosecutor's views on sentence.
Those American critics who seize upon the 41% figure as ipso
facto evidence of a German plea bargaining system have ignored the
implications of the immense difference between 41% and the figures
for felony disposition by plea that currently range upward from 95%
in some American jurisdictions.5 9 In a legal system like the German
57. STPO §§ 243(IV), 244(I).
58. See J. LANGBEIN, supra note 9, at 72-73.
59. Figures from 95 to 99% for varioui cities are collected in Langbein, supra note 1, at 9
n.11.
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that has (1) effective pretrial dismissal mechanisms for groundless
cases, (2) a rule that every case of imprisonable crime not thus dis-
missed must go to trial, and (3) a nonadversarial procedural system
designed to encourage unbargained-for confessions in open-and-shut
cases, there is nothing unreasonable about the proposition that 41%
of the cases are so open-and-shut that the defendants admit the
charges for no better reason than that contest is hopeless.
German courts do sometimes credit the contrition of the con-
fessed defendant as a mitigating factor in sentencing, 60 and part of
the motivation for some defendants to confess must be the hope of
thereby inspiring sentencing leniency. All of the purposes of the
criminal law, especially the reformative but the retributive and the
deterrent as well, incline sentencing courts to distinguish where they
can between remorseful and obdurate offenders. This intrinsically
sound distinction is debased in American plea bargaining practice.
Contrition has become a nominal justification for sentencing dis-
crepancies developed for procedural expediency; real regard is given
only to whether the accused has waived his right to trial. The
Germans, who must fully try every imprisonable offense, are not liv-
ing the American lie. The German supreme court has expressly pro-
hibited sentencing courts from pressuring defendants to confess
"through the threat of disadvantage - such as a more severe sen-
tence . . . . Therefore, it is forbidden (unzuldssig) to punish more
leniently the criminal who confesses, solely on account of his confes-
sion .... "61
Accordingly, for the Germans to be running a plea bargaining
system, thousands of professional judges have to be linked in a crim-
inal conspiracy to conceal the real grounds of sentencing, a conspir-
acy so successful that it has remained impervious to all forms of
detection other than conjecture in American law journals. We recall
that two laymen deliberate and vote with the professional judges in
setting the sentences in all these cases. If the professionals were op-
60. The statutory criteria for sentencing in Germany include, inter alia, the culprit's guilt
and "his conduct after the crime, especially his efforts to make amends for the harm (sein
Verhalten nach der Tat, besonders sein Bemtihen, den Schaden widergutzumachen)."
STRAFGESETZBUCH (Code of Criminal Law) § 46.
61. 1 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen 105, 106 (1951). The same
decision recognized, however, that circumstances contained in a confession may bear on such
permissible grounds of sentencing as the extent of the offender's culpability and his dangerous-
ness to society. Id Once again, it is instructive to see how the leading manual for defense
lawyers treats this subject. The tendering of the confession of a genuinely guilty accused, says
Dahs, supra note 40, at 260, permits counsel to narrow and direct the court's attention to
ameliorating factors in the accused's background and his criminal conduct. Dahs gives not the
least hint that confession is systematically rewarded, as in American plea bargaining practice.
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erating a clandestine plea bargaining system, they would be faced
with the extremely difficult task of deceiving the laymen in the actual
course of sentencing deliberations regarding the objects of particular
sentences, or attempting to make knowing accomplices out of the
entire cohort of citizens who serve on these panels. In this connec-
tion it is revealing to notice that in the 41% of Casper and Zeisel's
cases in which there was a full confession, the time spent on deliber-
ation (as distinct from trial time) differed "hardly at all"62 from the
cases in which guilt was contested. Confession does not lead to rub-
ber-stamp sentencing; sentencing is discussed and justified in all
cases.
Intangibles may affect adjudication, and it is relatively costless
for an accused thus to try to make a good impression. Counsel the
world over instruct their clients to appear in court cleanly attired,
although sentencing codes do not direct courts to take account of an
accused's dress and grooming. I have no doubt that confession, like
a clean shave, belongs to the realm of things that make a good im-
pression on a German court. But there can be no difficulty in distin-
guishing between a clean shave and cutting one's throat; neither can
there be a problem distinguishing the trivial inducements to confess
that exist in German procedure from the enormous and systematic
sentence differentials that Americans have constructed in order to
subvert the right to trial. It is we, not they, who engage in condem-
nation without adjudication and who employ a sentence differential
that risks pressuring the accused to bear false witness against him-
self.63
No modem multi-factored sentencing system, the German in-
cluded, can lack for rubrics such as "contrition" or "degree of culpa-
bility" behind which it would be possible to conceal American-style
sentence differentials. What the Germans lack is the need to engage
in the perversion. Having kept their trial procedure workable, they
have not had to coerce defendants into waiving either the form or
the substance of trial. American detractors of German procedure
have not been able to point to evidence of American-style sentence
differentials in German practice, despite the considerable expertise
that Americans have acquired in recent years in identifying and
measuring this mainspring of their own plea bargaining system.
Within Germany there are potent incentives for criminal defendants,
defense counsel, legal academics, politicians, and journalists to un-
62. Casper & Zeisel, supra note 12,'at 149.
63. See Alschuler, supra note 52, at 59-60.
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mask the legal system in a lie so enormous. The American critics
have, therefore, a great deal to account for when neither they nor
interested Germans have been able to detect the German plea bar-
gaining system. In truth, it is a figment of wishful American imagi-
nation, projecting onto others our own distinctive flaw. American
plea bargaining results from the breakdown of American trial proce-
dure. Blessed with an expeditious nonadversarial trial procedure,
the Germans need no such subterfuge.
C. Petty Crime
Continental and Anglo-American criminal procedural systems
both exhibit as an organizing principle the idea that the full set of
procedures and safeguards appropriate for determining charges of
serious crime need not be extended to cases of petty crime. In Amer-
ican law this distinction is most prominently reflected in the
Supreme Court's refusal to apply the sixth amendment right to jury
trial in petty cases.64
In German law, too, several of the most fundamental principles
of criminal procedure have been restricted to cases of serious crime.
We have previously noticed that the rule of compulsory trial applies
only to imprisonable offenses, thereby permitting the nontrial penal
order procedure for many misdemeanors. We have also emphasized
that the rule of compulsory prosecution applies only to felonies and
to those misdemeanors that cannot be fit within the two statutory
criteria of pettiness (minor guilt and lack of public interest) under
which section 153 permits discretionary nonprosecution.
At bottom, of course, this tendency of legal systems to remit cases
of lesser crime to a more brusque procedural subsystem is a response
to resource scarcity. Such cases usually raise only simple issues of
fact and law. If parking tickets were to be proceduralized indistin-
guishably from homicides, the criminal justice system would need to
be financed more lavishly than any modem society has yet shown
itself able to afford. Accordingly, less meticulous fact-finding and
otherwise lower levels of safeguard are permitted for offenses where
the complexity, the sanctions, and the stigma are correspondingly
lower.
I have elsewhere described at length the multi-faceted German
procedural response to the twentieth-century explosion of petty regu-
64. Despite the seeming breadth of the constitutional language ("In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to... trial... by an impartial jury. ... ). U.S.
CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added); see Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
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latory and motor vehicle offenses. 65 For present purposes it will suf-
fice to repeat66 that one of these procedures, the conditional
nonprosecution scheme of section 153a, can correctly be character-
ized as a mild form of plea bargaining. In a case of misdemeanor
that satisfies the pettiness criteria of section 153, section 153a autho-
rizes the prosecutor to decline to prosecute on condition that the ac-
cused agree to make a charitable donation, make restitution to the
victim, engage in stipulated charitable work, or the like.67 The ac-
cused who accepts the conditions thereby waives trial and escapes
with a lesser sanction, one that completely spares him the stigma and
practical consequences of criminal conviction. Although section
153a has thus far been confined overwhelmingly to traffic violations
and otherwise narrowly interpreted, 68 the only statutory limits on the
misdemeanors to which it might be applied are the two general crite-
ria of pettiness of section 153.
Americans seeking solace for American plea bargaining in Ger-
man practice sometimes purport to find it in section 153a. They can
succeed only by engaging in a fundamental confusion of categories.
Nothing done under section 153a bears on the constancy with which
German criminal justice prohibits plea bargaining or any analogue
of plea bargaining in its procedures for serious crime. In the United
States 95% of felony cases are disposed of by plea,69 in Germany
none. Hence in the realm of serious crime, serious criminal sanc-
tions, and serious criminal procedure, Germany is indeed a land
without plea bargaining.
III. CONCLUSION
Americans are justly wary of claims that plea bargaining does not
exist. We are periodically subjected to the announcement that some
prosecutor has abolished plea bargaining, after which we learn that
implicit plea bargaining has continued, supported by sentencing dif-
ferentials as drastic and coercive as before. We also know that in our
own history plea bargaining was long pretended not to exist, and we
have more recently seen the English duplicate our former reluctance
65. Langbein, supra note 27, at 451-61.
66. Id at 460.
67. See the translation in J. LANOBEIN, supra note 9, at 158.
68. See Herrmann, The Rule of Compulsory Prosecution andthe Scope of roseculorialDls-
cretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 468, 489-93 (1974) (discussing the procedure now
authorized by STPO § 153a as of the time when its authority was in ministerial regulations
under STPO § 153).
69. See note 59 supra.
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to admit our dependence on plea bargaining.70
Healthy suspicion has healthy limits, however. What recent
American critics of German procedure have failed to grasp (or at
least failed to admit) is that the healthy American suspicion about
plea bargaining has had a peculiarly indigenous context, in the
breakdown of common law trial procedure under the ever mounting
weight of the adversary system. Because the Germans have kept
their trial procedure workable and nonadversarial, they have not
had reason to subvert it. By overlooking that fundamental differ-
ence, the universalist theory of plea bargaining has rooted itself in
error.
We are less likely in the long run to be able to preserve the
strengths of Anglo-American criminal procedure if we refuse to ad-
mit the failings - or, what is the same thing, pretend that the fail-
ings are universal. The truth is that other procedural systems have
not become dependent on plea bargaining because they have not
corrupted their trial procedures. We must correct our blunder, not
wish it on others.
70. See text at note 38 supra.
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